Another big part of the homeland security boondoggle is the formula used to dole out federal funds. Originally, after 9/11, homeland security funds were distributed according to a formula that first guaranteed each and every state a certain minimum level of funding and then divvied up remaining funds according to the size of state populations. Not surprisingly, the 9/11 Commission was horrified by such a simplistic approach, which gave money to states whether it was needed or not. Consequently, the commission recommended in its 2004 report that funding be based “solely on risks and vulnerabilities, putting New York City and Washington, D.C., at the top of the current list.”
We need the everyday infrastructure working for every patient, every day. Then when the big things come down, we’ll be prepared.
Since then, there have been attempts to reform the formula to distribute funds based on the actual risk posed by terrorists. Unfortunately, these attempts have resulted in sometimes ridiculous results. Last year’s much-derided analysis by the Department of Homeland Security reduced New York City’s homeland security funding by 40 percent to $124 million, concluding that the metropolis contained no national monuments or icons—somehow skipping over the Statue of Liberty, the Empire State Building, the Brooklyn Bridge, and Wall Street, among others. Although some of New York’s funding was eventually restored, the homeland security distribution formula is still far off the mark set by the 9/11 Commission.
And so pork still abounds, prompting Congressmen Anthony Weiner and Jeff Flake to produce a list last March of the most absurd homeland security grants they could find. Standouts included $36,000 to Kentucky in 2005 to prevent terrorists from raising money at state bingo halls; $7,348 worth of bulletproof vests for the police and fire department dogs of Columbus, Ohio, in the same year; and the biggest whopper of them all, $8,000 in 2006 for a Wisconsin fire department’s clown and puppet shows.
The only silver lining is that these absurd preparations are probably not going to be needed. Why? Because terrorists like getting as much bang for their buck as anyone else, which is why conventional explosives, not exotic weapons of mass destruction, will probably continue to be their primary weapon of choice. “The reality is that conventional weapons are easier to manufacture, transport, and detonate,” says Acquista, a point graphically illustrated by the recent propane-based car-bomb attacks in the United Kingdom.
But let’s imagine a worst-case scenario: A particularly advanced terrorist group does manage to set off a dirty bomb, or a bioweapon begins to spread throughout the population. The natural instinct—evacuate—may not be your best option, and in fact most Department of Homeland Security plans do not envision anything like attempting to evacuate an entire city except in the extremely unlikely event of the aftermath of an atomic bomb blast.
Mostly this is because these kinds of attacks are much more limited in their geographic impact than our fear would lead us to believe and also because evacuating cities quickly is very difficult, as was demonstrated by New Orleans and the Hurricane Katrina debacle. Even on 9/11, when the destruction was confined to a small area of Lower Manhattan, it took six to seven hours to evacuate around 400,000 commuters by boat. With the subways out of commission, another 2.5 million Manhattan commuters made their way home as best they could, taking many hours in most cases and clogging bridges and roads.
Should the worst happen, unless your dwelling is in immediate danger, the best advice may be to ignore all the government-fueled drama and stay home, at least temporarily. Following an atomic blast, for example, “after seven days, the radiation goes down about 90 percent,” says Acquista, making evacuation at that time much safer. Acquista recommends sheltering underground in such a circumstance, which allows as much radiation as possible to be blocked by the ground and buildings above. In the event of a chemical attack, though, he recommends staying indoors aboveground, because nerve agents are heavier than air and hence will accumulate in basements. And although the suggestion that citizens keep duct tape and plastic sheeting on hand was much reviled when made in 2003 by then Secretary for Homeland Security Tom Ridge, Acquista believes it would be useful in a chemical attack to seal a refuge with tape and sheeting until the danger passes, because “most chemicals dissipate very rapidly.” Homeland security, it seems, really does begin at home.
